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LAW AFTER THE WELFARE STATE: FORMALISM,
FUNCTIONALISM AND THE IRONIC TURN OF
REFLEXIVE LAW*
Peer Zumbansen**

I. THE DEMISE OF THE WELFARE STATE AND THE
RISE OF THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
For some time now, scholars in law, the social sciences and economics
have been debating the future of legal regulation in an increasingly
denationalized world. The reasons for this inquiry emerge from a wide
variety of places and backgrounds, and every discipline has been carving
its own particular lens through which it perceives, traces and assesses the
specific trajectories of institutional and conceptual change. A hallmark of
*

This paper was written during a research fellowship at the Collaborative Research
Centre 597 “Transformations of the State” [Sfb 597] at the University of Bremen in 2007.
Earlier stages of this project were presented at the European Law Research Center at
Harvard Law School in March 2007, the “Beyond the State—Rethinking Private Law”
Conference at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and Private International Law in
Hamburg, July 12-14, 2007 and the Ecole Doctorale de Sciences Juridiques et Politiques
at the Université Paris X Nanterre on October 8, 2007. Thanks to Daniela Caruso, Anna
di Robilant, Fred Aman, Harry Arthurs, Jürgen Basedow, Jean-Sylvestre Bergé,
Francesca Bignami, Neil Brooks, Gralf-Peter Calliess, Hanoch Dagan, Helge Dedek,
Klaus Hopt, Nils Jansen, Alexandra Kemmerer, Duncan Kennedy, Christian Kirchner,
Ulrich Magnus, Patrick Monahan, Janet Mosher, Sophie-Robin Olivier, Lisa Philipps,
Erich Schanze, Karsten Schmidt, Dayna Scott, Gregory Smith, Holger Spamann, and
Talha Syed for their very helpful comments on earlier stages of this project and thanks to
Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen for the invitation to the Hamburg Conference. Particular
thanks to Danielle Allen, Marc Amstutz, Roy Kreitner, Russell Miller, Ralf Michaels,
Mathias Reimann, and Maria Panezi for very constructive comments and feedback in the
completing stages of the paper. Final thanks to Professor Stephan Leibfried and the Sfb
597 for the invitation to Bremen and to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (Grant # 410-2005-2421) for financial support.
**

Osgoode Hall Law School. York University, Toronto. Canada Research Chair and
Associate Dean (Research). Director, Critical Research Laboratory in Law & Society
[www.criticalresearchlab.org]. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca.

2

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 03

these efforts is the growing interpenetration of disciplinary discourses,
with “globalization studies” having emerged as either the crystallization or
final diffusion point—whichever perspective one may wish to take. In the
interim, writings and courses in “globalization and . . . .” studies have
become a more or less satisfactory label for these border-crossing inquiries
into the driving forces of global regulatory changes, national pathdependencies and newly emerging norm-creating actors. Despite their
political divisions, these studies, which have produced numerous guides to
these phenomena from within very vibrant scholarly discourses,1 suggest
that there is no way back to a world before globalization.2
One way, then, of identifying the consequences of globalization has
been to celebrate the “liberation” of commercial actors from government
intervention by making effective use of jurisdictional forum-shopping, tax
havens and radically decentralized business organization structures.
Another one, arguably on the other end of the choice-continuum, would
seek to radicalize globalization’s de-hierarchization trends3 in search of
realizing and nurturing civic and other bottom-up emancipatory powers,
however uncomfortably and inevitably they remain situated between
assertions of the global and the local.4 Rejecting findings of unstoppable
convergence across distinct political economies, globalization scholars
point to the ever-recurring, well-known, nation-state-based distinctions
and argumentative patterns: where proponents of globalization elevate the
necessary containment of government regulation of market affairs as the
defining feature of a globalized world, critics deconstruct such claims as
“ideology.”5
1. See, for example, the by now “classical” Globalization reader GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION:
POWER, AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002); THE
HANDBOOK OF GLOBALISATION (Jonathan Michie ed., 2003); GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD
(Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL WHY
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); Jeffrey D. Sachs,
Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief History of Global Capitalism, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 90 (1999); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
2. Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 113 (2005) (arguing how a deeply fragmented regulatory and conflicting global landscape is
reflected in a highly contested discursive realm, necessitating hard political choices).
3. Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy, 31
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 763 (1997).
4. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2002); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW. TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds. 2005);
CRITICAL BEINGS. LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds.,
2004), in particular Peter Fitzpatrick, Terminal Legality? Human Rights and Critical Being, in CRITICAL
BEINGS. LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT 119 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds. 2004), &
Sundhya Pahuja, Global Formations: IMF Conditionality and the South as Legal Subject, in CRITICAL
BEINGS. LAW, NATION AND THE GLOBAL SUBJECT 161 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004).
5. MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 98 (2003), “Moreover,
the claim that globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets solidifies as ‘fact’
what is actually a contingent political initiative.” Id.
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The question remains, where to go from there? Karl Polanyi’s concern
with the “double movement” constituted by the emancipation of individual
autonomy and the pursuit of public welfare, which he identified as the
greatest challenge posed by the self-regulating market at the turn of the
nineteenth/twentieth centuries,6 is still on the agenda—or is it?
An answer to this question is anything but obvious. The fundamental
institutional reference points of political and legal regulation throughout
the West in the twentieth century have become thoroughly unanchored,
and as we see a conceptual shift from “government to governance” in
contemporary sociological and political analysis,7 law—in this scenario—
appears to have become a fragile project. After its rise through the Rule of
Law, the Social Interventionist State and the Welfare State, its
contemporary fate seems to be both sealed and indeterminate. Sealed with
respect to the state’s fading regulatory impact on border-crossing societal
entities and activities, which have powerfully emancipated themselves
from jurisdictional boundaries and confinements. Indeterminate, in turn, in
at least two ways: the state might be reasserting itself either as unitary
actor or through regulatory cooperation and concerted efforts against
global threats such as environmental destruction or terrorism. Then, again,
it might not.8 The second avenue towards indeterminacy is paved with
strong doubts as to the state’s capacity to remain an influential institution
in channeling and shaping political governance domestically. As the state
becomes one of several actors in a dramatically de-hierarchized
knowledge society, the state’s proprium—political government, market
regulation, administration, responsibility for social infrastructure,
guarantor of institutional arrangements (education, health, safety) that
during the Welfare State’s era were created to complement a constantly
expanding body of individual rights9—seems to have come undone.
Alternatives to state-originating, “public” governance models abound, and
proposals of “post-regulatory,” “new,” and “experimental” governance are
6. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
TIME (1944), re-published in 2001 with a Foreword by Joseph Stiglitz and an Introduction by Fred
Block; for a new and fruitful assessment of Polanyi’s thesis, see Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation
of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR
GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG/MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES, MPIFG
DISCUSSION PAPER 07/1 (2007).
7. JAMES N. ROSENAU & ERNST-OTTO CZEMPIEL, GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER
AND CHANGE IN WORLD GOVERNMENT (1992); Saskia Sassen, Globalization or denationalization?, 10
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1 (2003).
8. For an overview of such options, see JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN.
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy L. Meyer, Customary International Law in the 21st Century, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Russell Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds., 2008); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL
LAW WORKS A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008).
9. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION. RECONCEIVING OF THE REGULATORY
STATE (1990), in particular chapter 1.
OUR
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offered both in competition to separation-of-powers and hierarchy-defined
models10 and in descriptive fashion to depict, more adequately, the
complex structures of today’s intersection of politics and economics.11
Much of the current mapping work of the knowledge society that is
being done in the social sciences12 and law13 unfolds in parallel with
incredibly fruitful economics research, predominantly within “New
Institutional Economics”—both inside14 and outside15 of its disciplinary
confines. As these interdisciplinary findings are beginning to be translated
back towards a more challenging reassessment of respective doctrinal and
conceptual starting points,16 the erosion of distinctions such as
public/private, economics/politics or state/market is mirrored by a
renewed, radical push for applied, objective sciences. Perhaps because
said distinctions become regarded as representative idiosyncrasies of a
century bogged down in the struggle over competing political economy
utopias, some of today’s analytical assessments and policy prescriptions
read strangely simple and straightforward.17 Yet, as is well known, the
10. Gunther Teubner, After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-regulatory Law, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 299 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986); Colin Scott, Regulation
in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION:
INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David
Levi-Faur eds., 2004); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); to see the elaboration specifically in the case of EU
governance read Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of
Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
11. Dick Pels, Mixing Metaphors: Politics or Economics of Knowledge?, in SOCIETY AND
KNOWLEDGE. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SCIENCE 269
(Nico Stehr & Volker Meja eds., 2d Rev. Ed. 2005), “A vigorous ‘economics of politics’ is currently
flanked by an equally vigorous ‘politics of economics.’” Id. at 270.
12. HELMUT WILLKE, SMART GOVERNANCE. GOVERNING THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
(2007); ROBERT HASSAN, THE CHRONOSCOPIC SOCIETY. GLOBALIZATION, TIME AND KNOWLEDGE IN
(2003); NICO STEHR, WISSEN UND WIRTSCHAFTEN. DIE
THE NETWORK ECONOMY
GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN DER MODERNEN ÖKONOMIE (2001).
13. KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, POSTMODERNE RECHTSTHEORIE (2d ed. 2001); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR,
DAS UMWELTRECHT DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT (1995); KARL-HEINZ LADEUR, DER STAAT GEGEN
DIE GESELLSCHAFT (2006).
14. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) and the insightful counterpoints developed by Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions
the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path Dependence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and
Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS 205 (1994); Paul A. David, Path
Dependence and varieties of learning in the evolution of technological practice, in TECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 118 (John Ziman ed., 2000).
15. In sociology: Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi and the
New Economic Sociology, MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG/MAX-PLANCKINSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES, MPIFG DISCUSSION PAPER 07/1 (2007); in law: Erich
Schanze, International Standards. Functions and Links to Law, in: LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 166 (Christian Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007).
16. Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer Zumbansen, Law, the State and Evolutionary Theory: Introduction,
9 GERMAN L.J. 389 (2008); Marc Amstutz, Global (Non-)Law: The Perspective of Evolutionary
Jurisprudence, 9 GERMAN L.J. 465 (2008); see the Symposium Issue on “LAW, THE STATE AND
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY,” published in 9 GERMAN L.J. 389-546 (2008), available at
www.germanlawjournal.com.
17. RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
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devil is in the details, and these details lie in the ever-more complex
structure of today’s invaryingly interdependent societies. As we seek to
rescue the larger questions around societal organization from the twentieth
into the twenty-first century against the background of concepts,
instruments and tools that are dramatically losing their explanatory power,
the consequences for disciplines such as law, economics, sociology or
political science have for some time now18 started to unfold,19 both in
research and teaching.20
This paper raises the question of the fate of law in the arrangements of
twenty-first century post-regulatory regimes. It does so with the single
mandate of contrasting the manifold implications and involvements of law
in societal organization during the last century with its precarious and
endangered place in today’s domestic and transnational settings. Choosing
formalism and functionalism as the central methodological tenets in
present-day contentions of law’s place in the regulation of societal affairs,
this paper seeks to illuminate the background and prospects of this
development by revisiting the functionalist critique of legal formalism at
the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century onward until the demise
of normative functionalism in the retreating welfare-state of the late
twentieth century (II). The next section compares the critique of welfare
state “juridification” by both conservatives and progressives as it emerged
in Western European legal thought in the 1970s and 1980s with the
emergence of legal pluralism and “extra-legal activism” in the United
States at that time, tracing the rise of responsive and reflexive law (III)
before addressing the current return of formalism and functionalism in the
area of contract law (IV). Section V concludes.

THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005).
18. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
279 (1987); but see Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992).
19. See, for a series of very informative and insightful roadmaps into this new territory, Paul Schiff
Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005);
Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2007); Paul
Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
20. Harry W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal
Fields, 12 CAN. J. L. & SOC’Y 219 (1997); Craig Scott, A Core Curriculum for the Transnational Legal
Education of JD and LLB Students: Surveying the Approach of the International, Comparative and
Transnational Law Program at Osgoode Hall Law School, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 757 (2005); Anita
Bernstein, On Nourishing the Curriculum with a transnational law lagniappe, New York Law School.
Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 06/07, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987347;
Mathias Reimann, From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course
for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN STATE INTL’L L. REV. 397 (2004); Catherine Valcke, Global
Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160 (2004).
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II. LAW’S PRECARIOUS POSITION IN THE POSTREGULATORY STATE
A. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM AS METHODOLOGICAL
GROUND RULES
Throughout the last century, the modes of legal regulation were
continuously contested, challenged and differentiated as the arms of the
state began to reach ever deeper into the spheres of societal activity. In
contrast, the current formalist legal discourse suggests a deep skepticism
towards the concept of “order through law” altogether. This renaissance of
legal formalism occurs at a time of profound changes in societal
governance. It is this context of social change that gives the current legal
theory assessments such crucial weight and impact. As the shift “from
government to governance” points to an irreversible transformation from
hierarchically organized political regulation to a heterarchy of conflicting
and competing regulatory models, the fate of law itself, previously deeply
implicated in the formulation of political governance, is becoming highly
precarious. What is problematic in the neo-formalist focus on the ‘here
and now’ is the loss of historical reference points, by which contemporary
contentions could be re-embedded or contrasted with preceding
experiences in legal regulation. As today’s turn to private ordering
arguably occurs in response to the dramatic challenges for legal regulation
domestically and transnationally, its present triumph comes at the price of
making invisible, the deeply dialectic nature of law in its eternal
coexistence with alternative forms of social regulation that have marked
law during the twentieth century.
Today’s neo-formalist attack on legal regulation is complemented by
a neo-functionalist prioritization of private ordering over “state
intervention.” Neo-functionalism defines the role of law and the state
through the single mandate of facilitating individual autonomy. Whereas
much of the twentieth century was characterized by the central role of the
state and by the creation of policy-driven legal norms and judicial opinions
that fueled an ambitious program of social engineering through law,
present contentions of functionalism emphasize the values of market
freedom and competition as endangered by state intervention.
With unacknowledged irony, this substitution of a functionalist
protection of the interests of society through law with a large-scale retreat
of the state in the name of individual freedom and the “demands of the
market” employs the very theoretical tools that progressive lawyers in the
United States and in Europe promoted during the 1970s and 1980s as
responses to the regulatory crisis of the welfare state. Those progressive
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scholars had turned to alternative modes of legal regulation seeking to
translate law’s generality into contextual, learning forms of socio-legal
regulation. Their hope had been thereby to save the political ambitions of
the welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate over the
substance and direction of political intervention. In contrast, today’s neoformalism and neo-functionalism threatens to cut the ties between current
quest to answer the challenges of globalization and the previous struggles
over law and politics. Its proponents characterize legal regulation as
inappropriately policy-driven and as undue infringement of the societal
actors’ capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously.
Contract law provides one example. If today’s neo-formalists criticize
contract law as paternalistic, cost-producing and competition-stifling, they
posit that contractual bargains would, if left alone, be more efficient and
productive.21 This assessment is a-historical in that it bears no connection
with decades of negotiation over the optimal degree of protection afforded
to the interests of contracting parties in a fast-evolving mass-consumer
society. The cloud of neo-formalist contentions that judges are allegedly
incompetent in their dealings with complex contractual arrangements22
makes this multidimensional, complex nature of contractual governance
disappear.23
Touching here24 on one of these fields—contract law—the paper
analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neofunctionalist approaches to law-making in light of the proliferation of
indirect forms of regulation. The core tenet of the paper is that while the
earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, whether conceptualized under
the heading of “legal pluralism,”25 “responsive law,”26 or “reflexive law”27
21. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 814 (2006).
22. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (n. 21), at 152 “Courts have trouble understanding the
simplest of business relationships.”
23. See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927); Morris R. Cohen,
The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1932); for a masterful reconstruction of contract law
discourse in the United States, see ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES. THE EMERGENCE OF
MODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (2007); for a recent reminiscence within the German private
law academy, see the book review by Fritz Rittner of FRITZ VON HIPPEL, DAS PROBLEM DER
RECHTSGESCHÄFTLICHEN PRIVATAUTONOMIE (1936) in 62 JURISTENZEITUNG 1043 (2007) (reading von
Hippel’s book as an important defence of private autonomy of relevance in present times, that Rittner
sees characterized by a(nother) takeover of private autonomy through politics).
24. For a discussion of a neo-functionalist approach to corporate law regulation, see Peer
Zumbansen, Varieties of Capitalism and the Learning Firm. Corporate Governance and Labor in the
Context of Contemporary Developments in European and German Company Law, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 467 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=993910; for administrative law, see Peer Zumbansen, Quod
Omnes Tangit: Globalization, Welfare Regimes and Entitlements, in THE WELFARE STATE,
GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
25. For an excellent presentation and discussion, see Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change:
The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973); John
Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle
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in the 1970s and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially responsive,
contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of legal intervention, the
contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence embraces a limitation
model of legal regulation, the rationale of which is captured by references
to “efficiency” and “market demands.” By treating market demands and
private interests as self-explanatory givens and by shifting the burden for
“intervention” into market activities to policy-makers and judges, the
current turn to private ordering effectively takes politics out of the
equation.28 With that, the neo-formalist and neo-functionalist critique of
the welfare state’s ambitious programs of legal regulation ignores the
degree to which the welfare state itself always represented only one of
many different possible institutional evolutionary steps in market
regulation and in an ongoing societal debate over the best form of
governing society.29 To be sure, by not integrating the emergence,
justification and contestation of the welfare state into the present
promotion of individual rights against governmental paternalism, neoformalists and neo-functionalists isolate their assertions about marketordering from a wider political debate in which institutions such as the
rule of law, the social or welfare state, private autonomy, property rights
and democracy should rightly be seen not as means by themselves, but as
mere institutional milestones and labels in a continuing normative
evolution of social ordering.30

B. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM: THEN AND NOW
The battle between law and politics is nothing new; it marks the legal
debates throughout the twentieth century. In continental Europe, mainly
Germany and France, this narrative sequences a development of the
relation between law and the state from the Rule of Law31 through an
Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal
Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
26. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
27. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
239 (1983); Rudolf Wiethölter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 501 (Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1985).
28. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 163 (1993).
29. NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WELFARE STATE (John Bednarz Jr., trans.,
1981) (1990).
30. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Charles A. Reich, Beyond The
New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990); Roy Kreitner,
Frameworks of Cooperation: Competing, Conflicting, and Joined Interests in Contract and its
Surroundings, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 59 (2005); Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society:
Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (2007).
31. Dieter Grimm, Der Wandel der Staatsaufgaben und die Krise des Rechtsstaats, in WACHSENDE
STAATSAUFGABEN - SINKENDE STEUERUNGSFÄHIGKEIT DES RECHTS 291 (Grimm ed., 1991).
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Interventionist,32 Social state33 through to the welfare state34 before
depicting a growing tension between transformations of the state into an
Enabling, or Moderating state35 on the one hand, and new concepts of
society (Risk,36 Knowledge,37 Information,38 Network Society39) on the
other. In England, the debate was predominantly focused on preserving a
formal core of law40 against its moralization or politicization.41 By
contrast, in the United States, the narrative still traces the content, validity
and promises of the “Realist”42 (later the “Social”) challenge to nineteenth
century “classical legal thought”43 that eventually led to a fierce struggle
over “rights”44 and to the frustrated reaction in the form of extra-legal
activism.45 Next occurs the powerful rise of law and economics46 and the
contestation by legal pluralism and critical legal studies,47 later opening up
32. Michael Stolleis, Die Entstehung des Interventionsstaates und das öffentliche Recht, 11 ZNR
129 (1989).
33. Giandomenico Majone, The European Commmunity Between Social Policy and Social
Regulation, 31 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 153 (1993).
34. FRANCOIS EWALD, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986); NIKLAS LUHMANN, POLITICAL THEORY IN
THE WELFARE STATE (John Bednarz Jr. trans., 1981) (1990).
35. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Zur notwendigen Neubestimmung der Staatsaufsicht im
verantwortungsteilenden Verwaltungsstaat, in JENSEITS VON PRIVATISIERUNG UND “SCHLANKEM”
STAAT 299 (Schuppert ed., 1999); for a discussion of this sequence of descriptions of the state, see Peer
Zumbansen, Quod Omnes Tangit: Globalization, Welfare Regimes and Entitlements, in THE WELFARE
STATE, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., 2003).
36. Ulrich Beck, From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure
and Ecological Enlightenment, 9 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC'Y 97 (1992).
37. PETER BURKE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE: FROM GUTENBERG TO DIDEROT (2000).
38. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Changing Role of the Private in Public Governance. The Erosion of
Hierarchy and the Rise of a New Administrative Law of Cooperation. A Comparative Approach., EUI
WORKING PAPER LAW NO. 2002/9 1 (2002).
39. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY, THE INFORMATION AGE:
ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE, Vol. I. (2d ed. 2000).
40. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
41. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
42. Compare Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988) with Brian Leiter,
Rethinking Legal Pluralism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1997); see Lon
Fuller, Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 629 (1958); Ronald Dworkin,
Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
43. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908); but see later the
reorientation of Dean Pound in Roscoe Pound, The Call for a ‘Realist’ Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
706 (1931), and the reply by Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222
(1931).
44. Elizabeth V. Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753 (1981).
45. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937 (2007).
46. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); for a “semi-outsider’s” history, see Anita
Bernstein, Whatever happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303 (2005).
47. Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM
AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); HARRY W. ARTHURS, WITHOUT THE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1988).
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into a babel of voices of multiple, competing and conflicting societal
interests.48 The battle over law and politics gains its concrete contours
within a specific socio-economic, cultural, and political context.49 The
relevance of comparing different contexts has recently been noted by
scholars, who have taken it upon themselves to depict larger trends and
trajectories in the development of legal thought, writing from both a
historical and comparative perspective.50 The importance of such
barometric and comparative assessments lies in their tentative and
explorative nature. Given the tremendous unruliness of doctrinal
categories and of social science models and categories with which we have
been trying to identify the core of law in an age of governance,51 it is of
great merit to push for a historical, comparative and interdisciplinary
research program, precisely because we are at an important moment for
the reassessment of the role of law.
Neo-formalism and neo-functionalism as the angles from which to
assess the current regulatory landscape shed a brighter light on the role of
law within the continuing politics of privatization. By focusing on neoformalism and neo-functionalism, one gains a clearer view of how
arguments of “necessity,” of “objectivity” and “naturalness” prepare the
ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of legal norms in
contexts that are clearly characterized by fundamental shifts from public to
private regulation.52 The presently renewed attack on contract adjudication
and governmental “intervention” wrongly depicts a market existing
without a government at the very outset.53 This depiction of the market
and the state as separate worlds enters into a troubling alliance with policy
recommendations, which promote the privatization of public services and
are often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction.54 Whether
48. For an excellent overview, see Günter Frankenberg, Down by Law: Irony, Seriousness, and
Reason, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 360 (1988), and Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal
Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (David Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006).
49. Allan C. Hutchinson, Michael and Me: A Postmodern Friendship, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 237,
242 (1995) “Judges, policy-makers, economists, lawyers, and citizens are forever situated in a socioeconomic context that influences them as they strive to influence it.” Id.
50. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 485 (2005); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State?
Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843 (2006).
51. Rudolf Wiethölter, Social Science Models in Economic Law, in CONTRACT AND
ORGANISATION. LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY 52 (Terence
Daintith & Gunther Teubner eds., 1986); Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in
Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
52. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
53. See Frank H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q. J. of Econ. 582,
606 (1924). “The system as a whole is dependent on an outside organization, an authoritarian state, made
up also of ignorant and frail human beings, to provide a setting in which it can operate at all.” Id.
54. For a critique, see Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of
Administrative Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 379 (2001).
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or not, and in which forms, private actors assume formerly public
regulatory functions, is not simply a sociological issue. It represents the
outcome of political choices and of other socio-economic developments,
unfolding at both the national and transnational level.55 The allegedly
available “fresh start” for societal self-regulation without state interference
stands in stark contrast to the observation already made decades ago - that
when market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private
autonomy they are exercising this freedom based on a public choice.56
The law of contract, then, through judges, sheriffs, or marshals puts
the sovereign power of the state at the disposal of one party to be
exercised over the other party. [. . .] The law of contract may be viewed as
a subsidiary branch of public law, as a body of rules according to which
the sovereign power of the state will be exercised as between the parties to
a more or less voluntary transaction.57
As contractual governance has come, since the 1970s and 1980s, to
form an ever-more important part of large-scale privatization and
delegation politics,58 policies of privatizing formerly public services and
competences by delegating power to lower levels are often implemented
without a comprehensive normative assessment of the merits and goals of
such delegation.59 But, the empowerment of market actors often results
from a complex combination of historically evolved patterns of
individualism,60 decentralized government61 and regulatory competition.62
The promise of private autonomy and individual freedom, which is being
55. This led Philip Jessup to his capturing three dramas about constellations within and beyond the
nation state that involve parallel questions of democracy and participation. See PHILIP C. JESSUP,
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 16-34 (1956).
56. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927).
57. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 586 (1932).
58. IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE (1992); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 155, 171 (2000): “. . .the contract becomes a framework and a set of default rules that will
help direct future gap filling.”
59. John Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the
Functional, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 53, 76 (1935). “(. . .) power to make regulations and questions of
principle should not, in general, be granted to a department; for a department, not being responsible to the
electorate for its policy, is unlikely to give sufficient consideration to the question whether or not the
regulations are sufficiently in accordance with public opinion to command general obedience.” Id.
60. See, R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY (1920). See also Frank H. Knight, Some
Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q. J. ECON. 582, 605 (1924). “Human beings are not
‘individuals’, to begin with; a large majority of them are not even legally competent to contract. The
values of life are not, in the main, reducible to satisfactions obtained from the consumption of
exchangeable goods and services.” Id. See also ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES. THE
EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN CONTRACT DOCTRINE, 227-78 (2007). “Late nineteenth-century
contract law took shape in the conflicts that were the culmination of this process of imagining the
individual subject. That vision of contract, and that imagination of the subject, in turn govern the way
Americans think about contract even today.” Id. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1368 (1983) (describing the “market” as a “battleground where opposing
forces can fight over the kind of policeman assigned to oversee the bureaucracy.”).
61. See Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
62. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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carved out within this context can only be understood against the
background of this historically grown and continuously evolving
polycontextural architecture.63 In other words, private autonomy neither
arises from nor exists in a normative or structural vacuum.
1. PROMISES OF FORMALIST LAW

Ever since Max Weber described legal evolution as occurring on a
trajectory from religious (charismatic) through traditional to rational,
formal authority,64 legal scholars have been conceptualizing new
challenges to legal regulation against this evolutionary background.65 It is
particularly the historical, socio-economic context of Weber’s writing that
proves so important for today’s assessment of his contribution. Weber’s
discussion of formal law occurred precisely at a time when law’s allegedly
formal qualities had come under close scrutiny from an arising political
legal theory that targeted the role of judges in “applying the law”66 by
resorting to a heaven of pure legal concepts.67 Weber’s analysis of formal
law was complemented by keen observations of the institutional changes
that characterized the new relations between state and market, changes that
in their complexity had become the focus of emerging sociological
thought and conceptualization68 and which soon prompted more
explorations of turn-of-the-century’s industrialization and the emerging
hegemony of the market.69
Formal, in contrast to substantive rationality, would claim that the law

63. Paul R. Verkuil, The Nondelegable Duty to Govern, in GOVERNANCE BY DESIGN (Freeman &
Minow eds. forthcoming); Gunther Teubner, State Policies in Private Law? A Comment on Hanoch
Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2008) “[T]he public/private
distinction is an oversimplified account of contemporary society. [. . .] Contemporary social practices can
no longer be analyzed by a single binary distinction, neither in the social sciences nor in the law; the
fragmentation of society into a multitude of social segments requires a multitude of perspectives of selfdescription.” Id.
64. MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (transl. from the German Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft, 2d ed., 1925, by Edward Shils and Max Rheinstein, edited/annotated by Max Rheinstein)
(1967).
65. See, for example, the masterful depiction by David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise of
Capitalism, WISC. L. REV. 720 (1972); for another brilliant, recent reconstruction, see Duncan Kennedy,
The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy
of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1031 (2004).
66. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
67. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
809 (1935).
68. See Emile Durkheim’s preface to the second edition of his THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
[1893] (W.D. Halls, transl., 1984), where he depicts a society consisting only of individuals as a
“veritable sociological monstrosity,” which he sees transformed by a “progressive weaken[ing]” of
territorial or communal ties and the rise of mediating entities. Id. at liv.
69. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF
OUR TIME (1944).
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is “inherently certain and predictable.”70 Formalism, enshrined for
example in the proposition of the “rule of law,” could be directed against
arbitrary power.71 Taken as such, it would mean to resist a “social
agenda”72 and “judicial activism”73 in the name of the letter of the law.74
Formalism would come to stand at the center of the magical, yet fragile,
construction of a “rule of law”, presupposing the law’s capacity to
negotiate and thereby to translate, according to defined procedural rules,
the different contestations and political manifestations of diverging
interests in society into a reliable and predictable catalogue of “state
action.”75 Yet, as the functions of government continued to expand, such
translatory practice76 would always carry with it the danger that law would
lose its center, its foothold and autonomy.77 As formalism claimed that the
law could be understood from within, primarily by extrapolating a logical
structure of a confined set of norms from a small set of higher-order78
principles, the need to recognize one or the other substantive bases for the
edifice of formal law became just too apparent. Lawyers, writing at a time
of extreme socio-economic and legal crisis, saw clearly that the
association of a system of law with a particular system of political
government posed dramatic challenges for any understanding of law in
70. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 364 (1973).
71. Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF
LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 97, 99 (Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987). “At times, the Rule
of Law has been used to legitimize and galvanize a challenge to entrenched power; at others, the ruling
elite has relied upon it to sanction its power and resistance to would-be usurpers.” Id.
72. For a brilliant analysis, see Ugo Mattei & Fernanda Nicola, A ‘Social Dimension’ in European
Private Law? The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (2006).
73. For a critique, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION FIN DE SIÈCLE (1997); see
Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Critical Phenomenology of Judging, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR
IDEOLOGY 141 (Allan Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
74. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138 (1999), at 1145-46,
enumerating the following three criteria of formalism: “(1) law is rationally determinate, (2) judging is
mechanical, [. . .] (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the class of legal reasons suffices to justify a
unique outcome; no recourse to non-legal reasons is required.” See also Cass Sunstein, Must Formalism
Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 639 (1999). “Formalism therefore entails an
interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that excludes or minimizes extratextual
sources of law.” Id.
75. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 367-68 (1973).
76. For a comprehensive discussion of the concept of translation in this context, see JAMES BOYD
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990).
77. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
78. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L. J.
949, 955 (1988). “The rationality, immanence, and normativity that characterize [formalism] are not
disjointed attributes contingently combined, but mutually connected aspects of a single complex.” Id. See
also id. at 1012-13 for an enumeration of the elements of his definition of formalism. In the same vein,
defending formalism against the critique of being non-political, is Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L. J. 509, 510 (1988): “I do not argue that formalism is always good or that legal systems ought
often or even ever be formalistic. Nevertheless, I do want to urge a rethinking of the contemporary
aversion to formalism. For even if what can be said for formalism is not in the end persuasive, the issues
should be before us for inspection, rather than blocked by a discourse of epithets.”
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and of itself.79 Elaborations of the functions of the state in the context of a
rapidly rising industrial society, accompanied by societal hardship and
political contestation, exposed legal formalism to a sweeping challenge in
the name of different values and interests. The more the state and its
emanations through legislative, administrative and judicial acts would
change, the more this would have a fundamental impact on law itself.80
With formal law turning functional, the covers of formalism’s foundations
were irrevocably drawn away.81
2. ASPIRATIONS OF FUNCTIONALISM

“Therefore the idea of the social man is the only possible
starting point of juridical doctrine.”82
Functionalism could be merely the (younger) sibling of formalism, its
necessary complementary and correcting feature. Formalist law would
have to be functional in order to survive challenges arising from societal
differentiation, political contestation, secularization and economic growth.
As such, functionalism may also be understood as an outright challenge to
the formalist claim to self-restriction. Functionalism would then be a
fitting formula for law’s ability to survive, mainly by remaining adaptable
and responsive. Functionalism in law describes the way in which the
flexibilization and modernization of formal law, in reaction to an
increasingly complex social environment, made up of competing interests,
claims and contestations, takes place if law is to retain a steering function
in the trials of society. Functionalism, thus understood, therefore
designates the degree to which the law answers to requirements, customs,
and necessities emerging from social practice or crystallizing out of public
policy deliberations. The important feature here is that a functionalist
approach in any legal area, from administrative to contract to corporate
law, is based on the premise that regulation is in fact possible. What
functionalism itself does not answer is who the author of regulation should
be.
Where functionalism understands law as a means to achieve particular
social, political or economic ends,83 this could speak in favor of
79. See, e.g., Léon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1917).
80. LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU DROIT PUBLIC [1913], troisième tirage (1925), XI.
“Toute etude scientifique du droit n’a-t-elle pas nécessairement pour objet l’évolution des institutions
juridiques? Étudier les transformations du droit public, n’est-ce pas étudier tout simplement le droit
public? Assurément.” Id.
81. Martin Loughlin, The Functionalist Style in Public Law, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 361, 362-63
(2005).
82. Léon Duguit, The Law and the State, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1917).
83. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910). This is only one of
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governmental “intervention” or against it, either stressing the
‘embeddedness’ of individual freedom or underlining the merits of
unfettered private autonomy.84 The institutional consequences as well as
the normative underpinnings of functionalism are not, at first, so easy to
see. The functionalism that responded to legal formalism’s abstract
sovereignty over a deeply divided, violently emerging market society
embraced the idea that generally there was, or could be, a societal
consensus on the desirability of the goals pursued. Given that law was to
navigate in deeply troubled waters, it was also clear that conflicts would
inevitably arise with regard to the concrete strategies and instruments to
pursue those goals.85 Not surprisingly, legal and social theory scholars
spilled considerable amounts of ink over the optimal conceptualization of
an adequate regulatory approach to a fast-changing society, characterized
by the increasing emergence of conflict zones and conflicting social
interests.86 Scholars of contract law87 began to explore the
constitutionalizing potential of private law to inform models of “private
government,” unfailingly recognizing the political nature of private law
regulation.88 Corporate Law scholars and economists explored the
troubling position of the ‘modern corporation’ between private and public
law, between investors’ private property interests and the larger societal
interests in the sustained economic performance of the corporation.89
Echoing corporate lawyers’ trouble with delineating the optimal forms of
regulating business, administrative law scholars found themselves between
the firing lines of the state and the market in a fast-evolving mixed

several possible concepts of functionalism; see Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 343 et seq., especially 351 (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007).
84. A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND
DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 174 (1905). “Legislative utilitarianism is nothing else than
systematized individualism, and individualism has always found its natural home in England.” Id. That,
however, Dicey found to be endangered by and in need of protection against: “democratic despotism.” Id.
at 304-05. “The legislative tendency was the constant extension and improvement of the mechanism of
government.” Id.
85. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
821 (1935) (highlighting that critics of legal formalism, “legal magic and word jugglery” were struggling
to reach a consensus of what the next step after the rejection of formalism should be).
86. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCIEN.
Q. 470 (1923); Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1932); JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH [1930] (1952).
87. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704 (1930).
88. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
89. ADOLF A. BERLE/GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); for a concise assessment of Berle and Means’ historical contribution and their subsequent
appropriation for a shareholder primacy justification of corporate (de-)regulation, see Dalia Tsuk, From
Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s
Corporatist
Origins:
Adolf
Berle
and
The
Modern
Corporation,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021273 (2007).
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economy of intersecting private and public actors.90 In the United States as
in Western Europe, administrative lawyers were soon awakening to their
highly politicized role in operating a constitutional polity through the
stormy seas of pre-war, interwar and post-war economies and ideological
contestations of democratic government.91 Central to all these scholarly
endeavors was the role of scientific progress and the role of experts in
finding the best legal solution.92 A major challenge for legal
functionalism, largely unmet, was the degree to which a government that
was activist, responding to crises and delivering public services, could
succeed in promoting democratic representation in the elaboration and
execution of its ambitious policies.93 Paving the way for the early twentyfirst century’s arrival of neo-functionalism, the technocratic functionalism
of the expanding twentieth century welfare state had widened, not bridged,
the gap between the state and its citizens in complex, differentiated,
multicultural and transnational societies.
[A]s the ideals of the Functional Society came only to be partly
realized in the twentieth-century welfare state, the functionalist
style in public law tended to preserve itself more as a disposition
than as the exposition of an alternative social philosophy. And
once this happened, the more positivistic aspects of functionalism
(power vs. power) gained the upper hand, and the underlying
idealist dimensions were suppressed.94
Carl Schmitt and Ernst Forsthoff, in German constitutional and
administrative law, are the most eloquent representatives for this turn of
functionalism.95

90. See only JAMES W. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
91. Harold Laski, The Pluralistic State, 28 PHIL. REV. 562 (1919); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG,
UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT 1870-1920
(1986); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS. SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998);
MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914-1945 (Thomas Dunlop transl.,
2004).
92. See only Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897), and
JAMES W. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
93. Martin Loughlin, The Functionalist Style in Public Law, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 361, 387 (2005).
94. Id. at 402.
95. Carl Schmitt, Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat (1930), ders., Positionen und Begriffe im
Kampf mit Weimar - Genf - Versailles - 1923-1939 133 (1988); Ernst Forsthoff, The Administration as
Provider of Services (transl. from Der Staat der Daseinsvorsorge, 1938), in WEIMAR. A JURISPRUDENCE
IN CRISIS 326 (Jacobson & Schlink eds., 2000).
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III. THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC
REGULATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
As the debates over the politics of legal regulation continued,96 later
developments, depicted by labels such as globalization, global economic
competition and deterritorialization,97 dramatically accentuated the
normative assumptions underlying the seemingly neutral ideals of expert
rule and scientific government. As political governments around the world
sought to address regulatory challenges arising from cross-border
developments, the hitherto pursued public programs of social policy came
to be seen as resting on increasingly shaky ground. As globalization began
to unfold within the fragile architecture of domestic legal and political
systems, the challenges to both the regulatory concepts and instruments of
the social engineers and the political hopes in the self-ordering capacities
of a democratic society became frighteningly clear. As the time horizon,
against which scholars and policy makers would commit their inquiry to
the project of “making basic changes [. . .] necessary if we are to maintain
the productive capability of the market economy while assuring our
capacity to maintain a productive and healthy environment,”98 was rapidly
shrinking, functionalism took on an ever more reactive and responsive
mode of adaptation. The mounting pressures on political governments to
master the socio-economic and legal challenges arising from a fastglobalizing world of increasingly interdependent trade relations were
amplified by deep-running societal concerns with questions of political
participation, representation and redistribution. Thirty years after the end
of World War II, Western industrialized nations found themselves under
immense pressure to translate high-flying political agendas into workable
regulatory instruments, which were increasingly met with apathy,
alienation and implementation obstacles.99
The challenges of globalization to domestic state-originating welfare
programs—that had in their growth during the twentieth century involved
dramatic increases in redistribution, juridification and infrastructure
96. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978); IAN R. MACNEIL,
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT. AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); ADOLF A.
BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); RALPH NADER/MARK GREEN & JOEL
SELIGMAN, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (1974); DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY. A VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING [1973] (1999); Richard B. Stewart, Regulation,
Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
97. Saskia Sassen, Globalization or denationalization?, 10 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 1 (2003); Ralf
Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction after Territoriality, in GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105 (Piet
Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004).
98. Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1377 (1981).
99. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975).
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provision—had a very domestic face. In fact, the arising critique of the
welfare state’s negative effects on societal self-regulation operated with
little reference to “globalization.” As the next section will show, the rise of
welfare state critique and the emergence of alternative modes of legal
regulation had its origins within the particular regulatory histories of
expanding forms of state intervention. Globalization, in turn, further
accentuated and fueled a transformation of public governance that was
already beginning to unfold from within the cores of western welfare
states.

A. THE EMERGENCE OF RESPONSIVE/REFLEXIVE LAW
The disillusionment both with the propagation of “rights” as a means
to address social inequality and with the allegedly “neutral” principles
underlying legal process and adjudication100 eventually prepared the
grounds for a growing discontent with law as a sound instrument of social
change.101 In response, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic began to
relativize law’s sovereignty. Feeling the weight of overly zealous and
inadequate forms of “juridification”102 and facing the costs of a
structurally and normatively exhausted welfare state,103 law’s autonomy
began to be seen as relative. Scholars saw law as one among several
modes of political regulation, certainly not as the only or even the most
promising one. Some rejoiced, because they had already long been hostile
to the state’s continued attempts to regulate economic relations.104 Others,
however, reacted to the continued expansion of rationalist, bureaucratic
regulation into the ‘life-world’ with grave concerns over the viability of
informal, culturally grounded understandings as the basis for societal selfregulation and cohesion.105
100. Albert M. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
101. Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 942-48 (2007) (describing the emergence of extra-legal
activism in response to the disillusionment with “rights”).
102. Gunther Teubner, Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF
SOCIAL SPHERES 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
103. Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of
Utopian Energies [1985], in THE NEW CONSERVATISM. CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS’
DEBATE [ed. and transl. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen] 48 (Habermas Ed. 1989).
104. See the remarkable 1976 foreword by Hayek to his republished work, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM
[1944], iii, at viii: “If few people in the Western world now want to remake society from the bottom
according to some ideal blueprint, a great many still believe in measures, which though not designed
completely to remodel the economy, in their aggregate effect may well unintentionally produce this
result.”
105. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS, vol. 2 (1982) [THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, VOL. 2: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON
(1985)].
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1. RESPONSIVE LAW

In a small volume, published in 1978, Philippe Nonet and Philip
Selznick carved out a political theory of legal regulation, in the center of
which they placed the concept of “responsive law.”106 They aptly
characterized the contemporary U.S. society as torn by competing views
on an ideal social order and placed the search for law at the center of this
larger battle: “Whatever the labels, and whatever the ideological affinities,
these perspectives are being tested today as legal institutions adapt to
changing attitudes and expectations, to social cleavage and
disaffection.”107 Building on Weber’s depiction of the rational quality of
modern law, Nonet and Selznick recognized the increasing differentiation
of law into specialized areas of socìal ordering. As Weber had seen the
system of law to be depending in large part on the emergence of a
professional body of legal experts, Nonet and Selznick identified how
expert rule would promote a separation of law and politics and,
increasingly, a “narrow conception of the role of law.”108 As this model of
law removed legal regulation and regulators “from the ambit of political
controversy and conflict,”109 “strains, opportunities, and expectations”
continued to arise that would lead to a conflict-laden re-approximation of
law and politics.110 The paradox of rational government lay in the fact that
the more legal experts asserted the objective nature of their actions, the
more these actions met with critique and resistance. Responsive law, then,
would emerge against the background of a long-standing skepticism
towards the autonomy and rationality of law.111 Front and center to a postautonomous, responsive model of law would be a form of legal regulation
that “perceives social pressures as sources of knowledge and opportunities
for self-correction.”112 Responsive law’s self-liberation from formalism,
however, moved a now explicitly “purposive law” (dangerously) close to
policy.113 The resulting difficulties would prove immense:
When accountability is to more general ends, dedication to rules is no
longer enough to shield officials from criticism. But to generalize
responsibilities is to run the risk of diluting them. General ends tend to be
impotent, that is, so abstract and vague that they offer neither guidance in
106. PHILIPPE NONET/PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. TOWARD RESPONSIVE
LAW (1978).
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 59.
109. Id. at 70.
110. Id. at 71.
111. Id. at 73; “The quest for responsive law had been a continuing preoccupation of modern legal
theory.” Id.
112. Id. at 77.
113. Id. at 82-83.
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decision nor clear standards of evaluation.114
Read against the promises of formalism studied above, the
functionalist aspirations of responsive law put law and lawyers under
immense pressure. Responding to the insulation of technocratic legal rule
from societal negotiations of values and interests asking the law to “foster
civility” through an “ethic of responsibility,”115 responsive law must
apparently rely on a problematic inner core in order not to be fully
consumed by societal forces. This core is formed in a combination of
process (participation) and substance (civility). At the time of their
writing, Nonet and Selznick proved perfectly attuned to the particular
challenges arising from complex governance modes in a system of
multilayered and interdependent social organizations. Their promotion of
reflected
their
valuable
“post-bureaucratic
organization”116
interdisciplinary search into the emerging complexities of the knowledge
society.117 Both the procedural and the substantive sides of the reflexive
law recipe to address regulatory challenges in a divided society, however,
prove to be extremely ambitious, perhaps too ambitious. Towards the end
of their book, the authors don’t hold back: “Responsive law presupposes a
society that has the political capacity to face its problems, establish its
priorities, and make the necessary commitments.”118 Here the bias of the
program becomes strikingly apparent. Against the background of the
trajectory of legal development from the nineteenth to the twentieth
century, the authors put forward a model of substantive legal regulation
that pays a high price to bridge the gap between law and politics, between
government and society. Recognizing that any reincarnation of top-down
regulation, regardless of the normative justification that is offered, would
further widen the legitimacy gap in times of regulatory complexity and
political apathy, Nonet and Selznick suggest that citizens ought to take law
into their own hands in order to reach consensus as to the direction of
social order. This, however, results in a powerful redirection of law to its
formalist mode, operating in a heaven of pure legal concepts.119 How else
ought we to understand the authors’ expressed hope that society come
together and identify “its problems,” “its priorities,” and “its
commitments”? The reason for the growing regulatory challenges to
modern law was and continues to be the rising complexity of society. To
address a multiplicity of values, interests and rationalities with a
dedication to democratic governance ultimately to result in consensus,
114. Id. at 83.
115. Id. at 90-91.
116. Id. at 99, with reference to Chester Barnard and Peter Drucker.
117. Id. at 100. “Participatory decision making as a source of knowledge, a vehicle of
communication, and a foundation for consent.” Id.
118. Id. at 113.
119. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
809 (1935).
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idealizes the forces of cohesion in a society that is actually deeply
complex and fragmented. Therein lies, to be sure, the great danger for law,
for political, in particular democratic theory and for any grand-scale social
theory. Therein lays, however, at the same time, great hope to better
identify the potential of law to play a distinct role in the complex array of
voices and forces.
2. REFLEXIVE LAW

Meanwhile, legal theoreticians in Western Europe posited a reconceptualization of regulatory law by emphasizing the necessity of law’s
reflexivity, its capacity to respond to the changing conditions of regulatory
implementation120 and the proceduralization of law.121 Reflexive law
promoted the opening of the law to the different, varied and competing
rationalities of a society highly differentiated along functional lines.122 As
the project of reflexive law became formulated in the context of an
exhausted welfare state’s regulatory capacities, the nature of law’s
involvement in societal processes was still at the heart of a critical inquiry
into the role, function and status of law.123 With reflexive law emerging
out of the eggshells of a fast-decaying welfare state, it was conceived in
light of a long generation of negative and positive civil rights, of a strong
interconnection between deliberation over social policy on the one hand
and of the cross-fertilization of administrative and constitutional law on
the other.
To be sure, the rise of reflexive law did not occur without
contestation. Reactions, many of them negative, were swift and farreaching. Niklas Luhmann observed that, if the concept of reflexive law
implicitly or explicitly defended law’s claim to “comprehensive
regulation,”124 reflexive law unduly and somewhat prematurely relativized
120. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
239 (1983); Karl-Heinz Ladeur, “Abwägung” - ein neues Rechtsparadigma? Von der Einheit der
Rechtsordnung zur Pluralität der Rechtsdiskurse, 69 ARSP 463 (1983); Rudolf Wiethölter,
Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE
221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
121. Rudolf Wiethölter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT:
AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 501 (Christian Joerges & David Trubek eds., 1985).
122. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
239 (1983); Niklas Luhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the
Legal System, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419 (1992).
123. Gunther Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 201 (1984); William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization, 8, 4
J. POL. PHIL. 1 (2000); “Like substantive law, it is guided by the aim of subjecting social and economic
activities to broader regulatory purposes. Yet it hopes to do so without dictating specific outcomes and
thereby contributing to the rigidity and ineffectiveness of some existing forms of regulatory law.” Id.
124. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM 94 (1993).
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the concept of system autonomy in a functionally differentiated society.125
Others felt that positing law as an “autopoietic,” i.e., autonomous, selfreferentially reproducing, social system126 constituted a betrayal of law’s
emancipatory political powers as a force of social transformation.127
Arguing from the perspective of democratic theory,128 the turn of law onto
itself as autopoietic law was seen as bolstering wide-spread privatization
and deregulation, which in turn would diminish the emancipatory forces of
law.129 Another critique took issue with reflexive law’s connection to the
concept of autopoietic law, which described law as operationally closed
(self-reproducing) and cognitively open (towards its environment),130 and
markedly pointed out the specific challenges for political (legal) theory
arising from this description.131
Reflexive law theorists, in response, acknowledged the merits of a
critique of legal formalism and its potential to look beyond the letter of the
law. But, other than the Legal Realists, proponents of reflexive law sought
to reach beyond an understanding of law that would describe its function
in the resolution of conflicts between “right” and “left,”132 or between
market regulation and freedom of contract.133 The theory of autopoietic
125. Niklas Luhmann, Some Problems with Reflexive Law, in STATE, LAW AND ECONOMY AS
AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS 389-412 (Gunther Teubner & Alberto Febbrajo eds., 1992).
126. See GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM (1993).
127. Erhard Blankenburg, The Poverty of Evolutionism: a Critique of Teubner’s Case for ‘Reflexive
Law,’ 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273 (1984); Hubert Rottleuthner, The Limits of Law: The Myth of a
Regulatory Crisis, 17 INT’L J. SOC. L. 273 (1989).
128. Ingeborg Maus, Perspektiven “reflexiven Rechts” im Kontext gegenwärtiger
Deregulierungstendenzen, 19 Kritsche Justiz 390, 396-97 (1986) (highlighting the dangers for regulatory
capture of reflexive law when legislative acts are mostly general and indeterminate).
129. This critique paralleled and echoed in many of its political it not its theoretical aspirations
developments in the United States: Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974); Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy
in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277, 1377 (1983) (highlighting the importance and great variances
of context that influence the modes of bureaucratic organization).
130. Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 12, 15 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988); Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 136, 138 (1989); “Formulations such as the statement that there are connections
‘between’ law and society’ (which presupposes that law is something outside of society) especially must
be avoided.” Id.
131. Joachim Nocke, Autopoiesis - Rechtssoziologie in seltsamen Schleifen, 19 Kritsche Justiz 363,
380 (1986) (arguing that autopoietic law resembles mid-nineteenth century concept-jurisprudence –
Begriffsjurisprudenz – that already Rudolf von Ihering and Felix Cohen had considered as out-of-sync
with societal differentiation). See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. R. 809, 809-10 (1935).
132. Teubner’s response: “Self-organization is at odds with the traditional political co-ordinates of
the simple left-right model.” GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM 64-65 (1993). But
see Joachim Nocke, Autopoiesis - Rechtssoziologie in seltsamen Schleifen, 19 KJ 363, 384 (1986). “Hier
wird keine vorschnelle ‘Ideologiekritik’ mehr geübt – schon der Begriff nimmt sich in der verchromten
Sprachwelt der Systemtheorie aus wie eine ehrwürdige Antiquität, die von den hier Tätigen freilich eher
wie eine peinliche Hinterlassenschaft gemieden wird. Hier will keiner mehr irgend jemandem ans Leder.”
Id.
133. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917
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law, which lay at the basis of the concept of reflexive law, posited the selfreferential nature of the societal subsystems, including law.134 This led to
an understanding of society as a social system made up of subsystems of
particularly structured modes of communications. Each subsystem, then,
would form the environment for another system, leading to a diversified
communication of societal (system) rationalities.135 The reflexive law
theorists rejected a bi-polar view regarding re-distributive outcomes or
progressive versus conservative political agendas. Instead, they suggested
that although the law was placed at a unique place from which it would
constantly receive manifold communications, influences and pressures
from different parts of society, its evolution depended on its ability to
maintain this intricate relationship to its environment.136 Its selfreproduction depended on its constant exposure to the forces of society,
while reconstructing these signals in its own language or code. Instead of
promoting the idea of an a-political law, the concept of reflexive law
radicalized and expanded the older critique of legal formalism and made
law receptive to the full spectrum of societal rationalities.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the American development became
determined by an intricate and challenging combination of activist
rejections of law as an instrument of the status-quo upholding power on
the one hand and the differentiation of procedural rights on the other. The
work of Charles A. Reich,137 Marc Galanter,138 David Trubek,139 Duncan
Kennedy,140 Gerald Frug,141 and Richard Stewart142 can be seen as
illustrative of this complex combination of societal activism and conscious
embrace of legal regulation. The continued elaboration143 and contestation
(1974).
134. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 136 (1989).
135. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM 64-65 (1993).
136. Gunther Teubner/Helmut Willke, Kontext und Autonomie: Gesellschaftliche Selbststeuerung
durch reflexives Recht, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 4, 14 (1984) (describing reflexion as a
process of self-regulation through which a social system thematizes and adjusts its own identity in the
awareness of other social systems operating in its environment in order to provide a useful environment
for these other social systems).
137. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
138. Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
139. David Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and
Development, 82 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1972). “Since the implicit, a priori conclusions about the role of law are
no longer valid, we must turn to specific efforts to understand the relationships among the legal, social,
economic, and political orders.” Id.
140. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
141. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1983).
142. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669
(1975).
143. Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative
Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655 (1985); Charles A. Reich, Beyond The New Property: An Ecological
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of these approaches144 eventually prepared the field for assessments of law
and regulatory governance,145 which address the serious challenges of
identifying the politics in a transnational regulatory environment,146
shaped by both public and private law,147 official and unofficial, soft and
hard norms.148
As demonstrated, concepts of “responsive” or “reflexive” law had
emerged at the intersection between a turn to or away from law as a means
of social regulation. Both responsive and reflexive law had sought a way
out of the dilemmas which had been identified by both progressive and
conservative critics of regulation and “juridification.”149 In light of the
growing awareness that legal regulation would have to deal
simultaneously with an increasingly complex society riddled with
conflicting interests and identities on the one hand, and with a
dramatically expanding scope of governmental regulation of areas of
society previously seen as remote, self-reliant and “private” on the other,
legal theory had to conceptualize a new model of law adequate to this
challenge. Responsive/reflexive law offered just that. In an ingenious and
very ambitious way, responsive/reflexive legal theorists suggested an
understanding of legal regulation as a process that could not be initiated
from a central, elevated place of sovereignty in terms of power and
knowledge. Instead, law would have to be understood as inherently caught
up in the conflict-ridden processes of a functionally differentiated
society.150 Despite the difference in degree to which scholars in the
respective camps were willing to accept the sociological description of a
post-bureaucratic society151 or a functionally differentiated society,152
View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990).
144. Charles A. Reich, The Liberty Impact of the New Property, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295
(1990).
145. At the forefront is the emergence of “global administrative law”: Nico Krisch, Benedict
Kingsbury, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005).
146. Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From
Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2001).
147. For administrative law, see Peter Vincent-Jones, The New Public Contracting: Public versus
Private Ordering?, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 259 (2007); for environmental law, see Jody
Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005); for
corporate and labor, see Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor
Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 261 (2006).
148. For a comprehensive overview of the landscape, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).
149. See Gunther Teubner, Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION
OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
150. Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 136 (1989).
151. PHILIPPE NONET/PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION. TOWARD RESPONSIVE
LAW (1978).
152. Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 12 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive
Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1983).
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responsive/reflexive law theorists posited that law would have to be
tentative, experimental, and learning. Such a conception had far-reaching
consequences for a conceptualization and application of law in an
environment that had become increasingly complex since the early days of
the rise of the interventionist state.153
The striking characteristic of responsive/reflexive law was that it did
not confine itself to the suggestion of subjecting all legal decision-making
to sophisticated processes of deliberation and negotiation. The
proceduralization of law154 did not stop at the formal level, where it
certainly led to a far-reaching reliance on procedure as a means to
strengthen the law’s sensitivity to “voice” over “exit.”155 What would
instead become central to the concept of reflexive law was its intricate
(and contested) connection between formal and substantive aspects of
legal regulation.156 While the formal aspects concerned the opening up of
the legal decision-making process to a process of societal deliberations
(“voice”), the substantive side of reflexive law could not have been
conceived in a more radical fashion. Giving up any hope to ground a
viable legal judgment on principle based on rational consideration, on
faith, or on specific political views, reflexive law theorists argued that the
responses of law to a specific context would inevitably emerge as a result
of never-ending processes of specialized rationality collisions.157
In this way, reflexive law took seriously the longstanding contention
of law’s perennial indeterminacy,158 but it went further than that. While
the critique of legal formalism as an ideology and a mask to cover up
political motives and economic rationalities159 asserted the possibility of
153. For an account of the U.S. American debate and, in particular, of the legacy of James Landis,
see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, 213-72 (1992); for an
account of the German development, see MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY
1914-1945 (Thomas Dunlop transl.) 35-44, 198-234 (2004). For a succinct and rather troubling analysis
of present-day efforts, particularly those undertaken by a number of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, to
reinstate the autonomy of administrative expertise against outside political pressure from the White
House, see Jody Freeman &Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
Harvard Working Paper Series available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008906 (2007).
154. See Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS
OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
155. See for the concepts of exit and voice, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY.
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
156. Rudolf Wiethölter, Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
157. Gunther Teubner, State Policies in Private Law? A Comment on Hanoch Dagan 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 835 (2008), Ms. 2 “[T]he distinction of state/society which translates into law as public law vs.
private law [. . .] will have to be substituted by a multiplicity of social perspectives which need to be
simultaneously reflected in the law.” Id.
158. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE 178 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
159. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470 (1923); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
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identifying a specific political concept or regulatory idea, which could be
taken as the basis of a legal decision (the “social” or “material” challenge
to formal law),160 reflexive law came to reject such mono-causalities of,
say, politics, or the economy, as explaining legal decision-making. Once it
was found impossible to determine the content of the law without
uncovering the values, ideas and interests that had found their way into a
norm, it became clear that the law, being operationally closed and
cognitively open, had to be seen as standing in a very particular
relationship with those social spheres, which are themselves determined
by rationalities other than those that governed law and legal thinking. It is
here that the reflexive law theorists moved beyond the critique of the
indeterminacy of law developed by the legal realists and critical legal
studies and radicalized the idea of law’s indeterminacy to reconstruct law
as one rationality among others in society. As a result, society itself ceased
to be conceivable as a unified, overseeable and identifiable entity against
which it is possible to uncover the ideological basis of law.161 Such a
model of society makes it impossible for lawyers to identify one single,
decisive motive behind a legal argument. Instead, the task of lawyers
would be to recognize the many ways in which the law is in fact
responsive to and reflexive of the many different societal rationalities,
which the law was charged to “translate” or to “reformulate” into its own
language, using the legal code.162 Law, in this understanding, is to be
conceived as both distinct—when considering its own rationality and ways
of “thinking” and “speaking”—and simultaneously immersed in society’s
ongoing process of differentiation, conflict and experimentation. “A
reflexive orientation does not ask whether there are social problems to
which the law must be responsive. Instead it seeks to identify opportunity
structures that allow legal regulation to cope with social problems without,
at the same time, irreversibly destroying patterns of social life.”163

Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982).
160. See Gunther Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 201 (1984).
161. Niklas Luhmann, The World Society as a Social System, 8 INT'L J. GEN. SYS. 131 (1982).
162. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM 19 (1993). “The system reconstructs its
own operations in such a way as to inform its future development in a system-specific way.” Id.
163. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
239, 274 (1983).
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B. FACES IN THE MIRROR
“One can reject the imperialist claims of the criterion of efficiency
and at the same time use economic knowledge
in order to understand what happens when the logic
of legal structures and that of economic structures
impinge on each other.”164
It is important to keep this background in mind, when assessing
contemporary developments. Today’s combination of neo-formalism and
neo-functionalism occurs “after the welfare state” and in denial of it. It
portrays law’s primary role as serving society’s needs to govern itself and
thereby blinds us to the historically grown embeddedness of private
ordering in a sophisticated legal-pluralist framework. What today’s
functionalism suggests is a smooth ride in social self-regulation from
which the law should, for the most part, be excluded or at least be kept at a
distance. It thereby obscures the deeply conflictual and hybrid nature of
legal regulation of which scholars throughout the twentieth century had
always been so conscious. Whereas historically formalism and
functionalism related to each other by way of conceptual and political
contestation, it seems today that both formalism and functionalism have
joined ideologically in that both present law as a politically neutralized
tool of expert management. This turns the earlier, historical turn of
lawyers to science and expertise165 on its head. The neutralization of law
has consequences: on the one hand, law is expected today to function in its
traditional mode where “true” legal expertise is required, for example in
the protection of property interests through the formal application of
allegedly “clear” legal norms.166 On the other hand, law should be
reflexive, meaning facilitative, indirectly intervening, empowering, where
external expertise—mostly of “market,” but also of the “scientific” kind—
is believed to be better equipped to facilitate social ordering. This
combination is ideological because both of these fields of expertise are
considered a-political, when in fact in all these references to “law,” the
“market,” and “experts,” the choice takes place within political, economic
and other normative frameworks. Neo-formalism and neo-functionalism
transform formalism and functionalism respectively. Formalism is no
longer seen as aspiring to, or supported by, a specific or general logical
coherence; instead, it becomes a fighting word against what is now
164. GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOEITIC SYSTEM 93 (1993).
165. JAMES W. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); John Willis, Three Approaches to
Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 53 (1935).
166. Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 THE WORLD
BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 1 (1998).
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deemed to be legal “intervention” into otherwise more efficient processes
of social self-governance. Functionalism is no longer associated with the
aspiration to achieve a specific goal and with the political debate out of
which a consensus in support of that goal eventually arose; instead, all
legal intervention is to take place or to be withheld in accord with, and in
response to, the “needs” of a functional group. It is the particular context,
the political climate and capacity to promote certain views that shapes the
communication of such needs.
The current revival of both formalism and functionalism occurs
according to a regulatory agenda and political outlook entirely different
from that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Two
developments are of relevance here: one concerns the delay with which the
changed social environment was methodologically assessed by
administrative and, certainly, by constitutional law scholars.167 The other
one arises from the unresolved status of the political relevance of the rule
of law or, in other words, the role of law in regulation. The urgency of
questioning what lies behind this misalignment is further manifested by
the manner in which progressive agendas are today again clashing with
claims to technical expertise. What we see colliding are claims of
bureaucratic discretion with those of judicial and democratic review and
control as well as claims of individual autonomy with concerns over
paternalistic public governance by the state.168 The recurrence of the same
oppositional patterns, which already characterized administrative law
debates over one-hundred years ago,169 prompts the question what the
differences might be between the discussions then and those taking place
now. What occupies the space between the rise of the Providential State of
the early twentieth century170 and the Enabling State of the early twentyfirst? This unanswered question drives the powerful revival of formalism
and functionalism in current regulatory theory and practice.171

167. Ernst Forsthoff, Daseinsvorsorge im Technischen Zeitalter in: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ELIA
KYRIOPOPOLU 191 (Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät ed., 1966), at 191; MICHAEL
STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914-1945 206 (Thomas Dunlop transl., 2004).
“Administration had recourse to private law on a previously unheard-of scale and pushed into areas of the
private sector, where it was confronted by all the implications of competition law, labour law, and tax
law. The spectrum of administrative law doctrine shifted accordingly. But these changes did not have the
political drama of a newly created constitution; instead they manifested themselves more as slow shifts
whose significance was usually only recognized in retrospect.” Id.
168. Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism,
Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).
169. See, John Willis, Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and
the Functional, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 53 (1935).
170. FRANCOIS EWALD, L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986).
171. Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary
Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853 (2005).
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1. THE TURN TO MARKET

“If the future already lay in history’s wallet, the social-political task
was to call its impending forms into being.”172
Across the divides of disciplinary subfields, a growing number of
scholars are promoting the return to a strictly limited role of the law in
favor of a market-based regime of self-regulation. The neo-formalists and
neo-functionalists confess to a troubling loss of faith in adjudication173 in
the name of an approach to legal regulation that is allegedly more
responsive to market demands and less prone to the much-contested
attempts at social engineering by judges.174 The renewed hostility towards
judges is nourished by decades of policy-driven, substantivist judicial
interpretation of legal rules.175 The invocation of formalism now serves to
tame, stifle and silence a judiciary, which is seen as “activist” and
overzealous.176
The lack of sophistication of this analysis is striking. If it were really
true that there can be an effective rule making and rule application, but
that it should not be placed in the hands of overzealous judges, we could
indeed be prompted to take the anti-judiciary affect seriously. Instead, the
attack on judges becomes an attack on the law itself, which the neoformalist reduces to a spiritless, technical body of rules, allegedly made by
men and best placed in the hands of men—not of judges. This move
against the judiciary and the law seeks to obscure the fundamental quality
of rules, which are, in the moment that they are applied through a
commonly established institutional set-up, always already “pieces in a
larger compromise of interests” and as such not amenable to ad-hoc
changes, whether in the name of “justice” or any other “spirit.”177
To be sure, the problem that motivates the critique of adjudication is
not whether it is judges, parliaments or administrative agencies that are
making rules. It is the idea that law is part of a larger normative
172. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS. SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 399
(1998).
173. See, on the one hand, Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of Reason/Coercions in Law, 57 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 727 (2003), and on the other, Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005).
174. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000);
Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369 (2004).
175. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982); ClausWilhelm Canaris, Wandlungen des Schuldvertragsrechts - Tendenzen zu seiner “Materialisierung”, 200
ARCHIV DER CIVILISTISCHEN PRAXIS (ACP) 273 (2000).
176. For a powerful critique of such claims, here made in constitutional law, see Allan Hutchinson,
Judges and Politics: An Essay from Canada, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 275-93 (2004).
177. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 383 (1973).
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framework, the actual realization of which has been, mostly for
historically contingent reasons,178 placed within a particular institutional,
complex political, socio-economic framework that is particularly troubling
to the neo-formalists and neo-functionalists. It is for this reason that
appeals to legislative action over judicial activism or, say the work of
expert committees,179 are mere smoke and mirrors. Even if the legislator
demanded of the judge to act “formally,” it would still be the case that the
judge must ask exactly the same question about this rule as about any
other that comes to him (or her) from the legislature. Its enactment
represented a compromise of interests based on some set of quite possibly
conflicting expectations about how its application would affect the future
distribution of satisfactions.180
This new confidence in a formalist understanding of law is
accompanied by a powerful and highly influential defense of functionalist
approaches to legal regulation. Judges and, for that matter, lawmakers,
should “interfere” with societal processes of self-organization only where
there is a legitimate basis for such intervention, which means that they
should usually abstain. The critique of the role of judges is thus intimately
tied to a radical critique of the state and of law as both an institution and
instrument of social change. Whereas at the height of the turn-of-thecentury Interventionist and emerging welfare state functionalism would
encompass the administration’s use of law as an instrument of social
change, often pushed forward against the resistance of a conservatively
staffed judiciary,181 today’s neo-functionalism seeks to domesticate both
the state and the judiciary by emphasizing state institutions’ incompetence
to properly order society. Instead, the neo-functionalist emphasizes
society’s quasi-natural powers to self-regulate its affairs, without undue
and ill-fitting intervention by public authorities.

2. CONCEPTUAL PATHS

Conceptually, form and function have always been two sides of the
same coin. The appeal of formalism to coherence, authority and unity
stands in an ambiguous relation to the aspiration of functionalism to
substantive goals, ends-means correlations182 and institutional
178. Niklas Luhmann, Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft, 9 Rechtshistorisches Journal 176
(1990).
179. Paul Kirchhof, Demokratie ohne parlamentarische Gesetzgebung?, 54 NEUE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT (NJW) 1332 (2001).
180. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 389 (1973).
181. JAMES W. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
182. Max Weber, The Nature of Social Action, in WEBER. SELECTIONS IN TRANSLATION 7-32 (W.G.
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instrumentalization. But the modesty of one—formalism—is the hubris of
the other—functionalism. The functionalist’s submission of legal
instruments to substantive goals had to reckon with the normative grounds
of formal guarantees, rights, and procedures. Recognizing that the grounds
of legal unity and legal instrumentalism are inherently caught in a
paradoxical relation,183 formalists and functionalists saw how they were
inextricably intertwined so that one approach could never exist without the
other.
Against the background of rich historical and conceptual studies,
comparative legal scholarship has only slowly begun to explore the
parallels, disjunctures and overlaps between public and private regulatory
law here and there. After conflict of laws scholars had already posited the
need to embed their assessments in a deeper comparative understanding of
the existing public/private regulatory cultures in different countries in the
1970s,184 impulses today are coming from administrative law scholars on
the one hand185 and constitutionalization scholars on the other.186 As these
inquiries continue, one can—unsurprisingly—recognize a distinct
renaissance of visions of social order without formal law elements lying at
their base.187 While not intended, this “new legal pluralism,” as pointed
out by its discontents,188 runs the risk of sailing hard on the winds of neoRunciman ed., E. Matthews transl., 1978).
183. Niklas Luhmann, The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes in Law and Legal
History, 15 J. LAW & SOC. 153 (1988); Gunther Teubner, Dealing With Paradoxes: Luhmann,
Wiethölter, Derrida, in PARADOXES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW 41 (Oren Perez & Gunther Teubner
eds., 2006); Peer Zumbansen, Book Review: Niklas Luhmann’s Law as a Social System (2004), 15 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 453 (2006).
184. CHRISTIAN JOERGES, ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES KOLLISIONSRECHTS. DIE
‘GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS’ UND DIE ‘KRISE DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS’
(1972); Rudolf Wiethölter, Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz - falsche Fronten im IPR und
Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT UND RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG IM
AUSGANG DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS 213 (Alexander Lüderitz & Jochen Schröder eds., 1977).
185. Carol Harlow, European Administrative Law and the Global Challenge, in THE EVOLUTION OF
EU LAW 261 (Paul Craig & Grainne de Búrca eds., 1999); Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law:
The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 187 (2006); Richard J. Stillman II, Twenty-First
Century United States Governance: Statecraft and the Peculiar Governing Paradox it Perpetuates, 81
PUB. ADMIN. 19 (2003); Mark Bevir & R.A.W. Rhodes, Searching for Civil Society: Changing Patterns
of Governance in Britain, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 41 (2003); Robert Elgie, Governance Traditions and
Narratives in Public Sector Reform in Contemporary France, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 141 (2003); Werner Jann,
State, Administration and Governance in Germany: Competing Traditions and Dominant Narratives, 81
PUB. ADMIN. 95 (2003).
186. See, e.g., Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317 (2002)
187. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. OF
TRANSNAT'L L. 485 (2005); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections
on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 25 (2003), Sally
Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on
the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005).
188. Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of
Thought, Presentation at
Harvard Law School, 5 March 2005, available at:
http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MKPluralism-Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf; Martti Koskenniemi,
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liberal, deregulatory politics.189
It is against this background that we may gain a deeper,
contextualized, understanding of the present dominance of functionalism
in many fields of law and policy on both sides of the Atlantic. Certainly
after 1989, there has been an ever more widely held view that we are
witnessing a global convergence of modes of thinking about economic
regulation and state governance. The “end of history,” so famously
declared by Fukuyama in 1992,190 eventually eclipsed the account by
Michel Albert, that even in light of strong trends of convergence,
differences between capitalist regimes would remain strong.191 The
pervasive power of the end of history thesis in law has put promoters of
differentiated, historically informed assessments of the role of law as an
instrument of social change on the defensive, while allowing for
ubiquitous references to the law and the “rule of law” to occur in even the
most complex regulatory contexts.192
3. DEJA VU? THE DISCURSIVE RETURN OF REFLEXIVE LAW

The current operation of formalist/functionalist concepts in legal
regulation builds on regulatory experiences that unfolded in the last few
decades and that are without direct parallels to the first waves of formalist
thinking at the turn of the nineteenth/twentieth centuries. It is an important
feature of the current legal regulatory discourse that its participants are
arguing against the background of a complicated and sobering set of
experiences with law.193 From the impossibility of preventing outrageous
crime194 to law’s exhaustion throughout the ambitious progressive political
attempts to consolidate “rights” as core assets in a liberal society,195 law
The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2007).
189. Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their latest Incarnations in Contemporary
Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 853 (2005); Harry W. Arthurs, The
Administrative State Goes to Market (and Cries ‘Wee, Wee, Wee’ All the Way Home), 55 U. TORONTO L.
J. 797 (2005).
190. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
191. MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISME CONTRE CAPITALISME (1991) [Engl. 1993] ; Michel Albert,
The Future of Continental Socio-Economic Models, MPIfG Working Paper 97/6, June 1997, available at
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp97-6/wp97-6.html (last visited May 2, 2008).
192. David Kennedy, Laws and Development, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 20 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003).
193. See already the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958), and Lon Fuller, Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 629 (1958); see also Michael Bazyler, WWW.SWISSBANKCLAIMS.COM: The Legality
and Morality of the Holocaust-Era Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 64 (2001).
194. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2003).
195. David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis
in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
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has come to be conceptualized as playing a highly ambivalent role in a
deregulatory, privatized environment.196 The long-term consequences of
the recent, admittedly moderate, experimentations with finding a ‘third
way’ between socialism and capitalism are still matters of speculation.197
Meanwhile, the law has become a problematic, at best ambivalent, and
often seemingly unreliable player in the discursive set of contemporary
politics.198 Law’s memory becomes increasingly short-lived, and high
stakes of political contestation, such as the fight over consumer protection
rights,199 are eventually leveled and comfortably integrated into
mainstream legal discourse. It becomes ever more difficult to trace, let
alone to teach, the reality of conflict over rights even in recent history.200
Because of the hegemony of economic thinking in law,201 law is caught in
polarizing debates over efficiency vs. planning, private vs. public ordering,
self-government vs. command/control, etc. Still, contemporary discussions
about the merits and limits of privatization should always be taken as
reflections on a long-standing struggle over social emancipation and
contested forms of political government. Contractual governance is in the
center of contemporary privatization and post-privatization discourses.202

IV. CONTRACT VERSUS CONTRACT LAW: THE FALSE
PROMISE OF SOCIAL NORMS
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to a brief discussion of how
196. Gunther Teubner, After Privatisation? The Many Autonomies of Private Law, in FROM
DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW 51
(Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samuli Hurri eds., 1999).
197. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1999);
ANTHONY GIDDENS, EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL AGE (2006).
198. Jürgen Habermas, Interpreting the Fall of a Monument, 4 GERMAN L. J. 701 (2003).
199. See Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and the Search for Empowerment, 19 CAN. BUS. L.J. 397
(1991); Iain Ramsay, Consumer Law and Structures of Thought: A Comment, 16 J. CONST. POL. 79
(1993); Andreas Maurer, Consumer Protection and Social Models of Continental and Anglo-American
Contract Law and the Transnational Outlook, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (2007).
200. Geraint Howells & Thomas Wilhelmsson, EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?, 28 EUR. L.
REV. 370 (2003).
201. See, generally, CHRISTIAN LAVAL, L’HOMME ÉCONOMIQUE. ESSAI SUR LES RACINES DU
NÉOLIBÉRALISME 183 (2007). “. . . la science économique se constitue comme discours de connaissance
positive d’une réalité qui a ses propres lois et ne veut plus dépendre d’autres considerations de la morale
et de la politique, rejetées comme étrangères au champ économique.” Id. Allan C. Hutchinson, Michael
and Me: A Postmodern Friendship, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 237, 252 (1995) “For all the hard work of the
consumer lobby, the increasing domination of homo economicus is illustrated by the fact that public
discourse has become hostage to economics and has begun to dance to, instead of call, the economic
tune . . .” Id.
202. Gunther Teubner, After Privatisation? The Many Autonomies of Private Law, in FROM
DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW 51
(Thomas Wilhelmsson & Samuli Hurri eds., 1999).
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formalist/functionalist legal thinking has become crucial in a central area
of contemporary regulatory debate. The neo-formalist and neofunctionalist turn of contractual governance reveals how variations of
responsive/reflexive law have further accentuated the detachment of
contract regulation from a larger political contestation of the goals of
contractual governance. Yet, the response cannot simply be to aim at a repoliticization of contract law. Against the theoretical background of a
functionally differentiated society, it is more adequate to understand
contract law as a troubled site of intense regulatory experimentation and
innovation. Contract law is a central example of “law after the welfare
state,” because it represents a regulatory regime that is constituted and
shaped by an ambiguous relationship between “state” and “society” in the
institutional evolution from the Rule of law to the welfare state. In the
neo-formalist and neo-functionalist reading, however, contractual
governance is offered as a formidable solution to the paradox of
formalist/functionalist law, which it manages in turn to eclipse in its
entirety.

A. SOCIAL NORMS VERSUS LAW?
The present contestation of contract adjudication and the promotion of
social norms as offering a more efficient regulatory framework than
governance by contract law203 is a representation par excellence of private
law “after the welfare state.” This invocation of social self-regulation,
which is primarily fuelled by a deep skepticism about the political
regulation of commercial relations, is further accentuated in the context of
an increasingly de-territorialized sphere of economic interaction.204 To be
sure, the reference to the transnational nature of commercial activity
serves as a ground for turning against contract adjudication also on the
domestic level. Another lesson of the twentieth century regulatory
experience with reflexive law is—deliberately—cast aside: in order to
fully understand the dynamics of regulatory politics on a larger scale, we
need to carefully trace the contextual conditions under which we make
legal arguments. In the reductionist form in which ‘traditionalists’ are
contrasted with “transnationalists”205 it is to be feared that the fight for
recognition of the latter results in the undoing of the emancipation of the
former.
In turn, the maneuvering room for courts adjudicating derailed
contractual arrangements is shrinking as social norms are seen as
203. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
204. Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8
EUR. L. J. 400 (2002).
205. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA (1999), ch. 1.
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providing a comparatively more efficient and cost-reducing regulatory
tool.206 The legal system recedes into the background from where contract
parties merely perceive it as a threat, not as fundamentally structuring the
arrangements to begin with. This approach to social norms breaks not only
with the analysis of the political basis of both contractual arrangements
and the market,207 it also aims to disentangle contractual governance from
the socio-economic, formal/informal context in which actors make
choices. This marks the social norms theorists’ deliberate departure from
work on relational contract and “private government”208 that had grown
out of the legal realist critique of classical legal contract theory.209 Earlier
work by progressive lawyers had identified the growing difficulties of
situating modern contractual governance in either the public (law) or
private (law) realm, recognizing that both were two sides of the same coin
of contractual governance.210 In contrast, social norms scholars from law
and economics (L&E) seek to redraw the demarcation lines between the
market and the state. Their interest in social norms is not in the basis of
norm-making as part of a larger exploration of sites of social willformation, but instead reflects their intention to insulate phenomena of
contemporary regulatory governance from more comprehensive
assessments of the contexts in which governance modes are emerging.

206. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 148 (2000).
207. Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1932); John P. Dawson,
Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947).
208. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What we do and what we do not know, 3 WIS. L.
REV. 483 (1985).
209. Karl Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L. J. 704 (1930);
Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
210. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001); see already Carol Harlow, “Public” and “Private” Law: Definition
without Distinction, 43 MOD. L. REV. 241, 249 (1980): “The intervention of a static “public/private”
classification can only hinder this development by blinding us to obvious parallels and encouraging
uneven growth.”
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B. ECONOMICS VERSUS JUSTICE
“A post-industrial society must discover ways to
decentralize not only commodity production,
but also significant ways of lawmaking.”211
The recent “discovery” of social norms by L&E scholars212 occurs in
striking insulation not only from a longstanding and intense scholarly
debate,213 but also from a tremendously rich and troubled historical
evolution of regulatory politics in the area of contract law. With little
historical interest in such accounts, the L&E interest in norms is biased
towards a particular, efficiency-oriented understanding of norms and
regulation in present-day contestations of allegedly excessive state
intervention. This approach, however, closes all doors on a more nuanced
understanding of the forever fragile relationship between social norms and
the legal form, one that stood at the centre of landmark work in the
sociology of law.214 It in fact makes a mockery of long-standing insights
into the artificial nature of all legal propositions.215 Instead of perceiving
social norms as “living law” and as a platform for a more comprehensive
211. Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism. Review of Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law.
How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417, at 418 (1993).
212. In particular see, ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Richard A. Posner, Social
Norms, Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553 (1998); see the
critique by Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537
(1998).
213. For a brilliant introduction to the issues and the literature, see Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social
Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719
(1973); Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.
J. 814 (1986-1987); Gunther Teubner, Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1987); Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many
Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hierarchy, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 763 (1997).
214. GEORGES GURVITCH, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (ORIG. PUBLISHED IN FRENCH AS PROBLÈMES DE LA
SOCIOLOGIE DU DROIT) (1947), 41: “The social reality of law is neither an immediate datum of intuition
nor a content of sense perception, but is rather a construct of reason, moreover, detached from social
reality as a total phenomenon.” Later, Gurvitch, offers this definition:
Law represents an attempt to realize in a given social environment the idea of justice (that is, a
preliminary and essentially variable reconciliation of conflicting spiritual values embodied in a
social structure), through multilateral imperative-attributive regulation based on a determined link
between claims and duties; this regulation derives its validity from the normative facts which give
a social guarantee of its effectiveness and can in certain cases execute its requirements by precise
and external constraint, but does not necessarily presuppose it.

Id. at 47.
215. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (orig. published in
German as GRUNDLEGUNG DER SOZIOLOGIE DES RECHTS, 1913) (1962), 486: “The reason why the
dominant school of legal science so greatly prefers the legal proposition to all other legal phenomena as
an object of investigation is that it tacitly assumes that the whole law is to be found in the legal
propositions.”
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exploration of present-day regulatory proposals against the background of
the evolutionary trajectory of welfare and post-welfare state “regulatory
cultures,”216 today’s neo-formalists and neo-functionalists’ attack on law is
more than a mere plea to recognize the (self-)regulatory capacity of social
norms. It is, rather, the rejection of a critical assessment of how norms are
being translated into law, how legal formation takes place in the context of
highly differentiated and, thus, always contested spheres of social activity.
What really lies behind the plea for social norms over law is not a genuine
interest in norm-formation but a disregard for processes of negotiation and
contestation. This explains the hesitant reception of legal sociology and
the even greater reluctance towards legal pluralism in the otherwise
wholehearted proclamation of the primacy of norms over law. While
sociological and legal pluralist research on norms has for a long time
failed to exert significant influence on norm-theory, perhaps because of
the area’s preoccupation with groups as “operative agents” and L&E
scholars’ respective focus on “methodological individualism,”217 there are
a few signs for change.218 Clearly, the demand for a fuller appreciation of
sociological and legal pluralist work in the ongoing exploration of the law
after the welfare state is enormous, and one can reasonably expect that the
sophistication of the research in increasingly combining domestic
perspectives with careful studies of emerging transnational regulatory
patterns will eventually influence the present work on norms.
The current introspection is important in the context of this paper not
only because it illustrates the contentious relationship between formal and
informal law, an understanding of which is central to present studies of
contemporary law making developments in different areas of law.219 The
new interest in norms also underlines the precarious status of legal
regulation per se. In an increasingly transnational regulatory environment,
216. See Errol Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAW & POLICY 355 (1986);
Colin Scott, New-ish Governance and the Legitimacy of the EU, 3 CLPE COMPARATIVE RESEARCH IN
LAW & POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH PAPER (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003824.
217. Ellickson, supra note 212, at 542; see also Robert D. Cooter, Against Legal Centrism. Review of
Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law. How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 81 CAL. L. REV. 417 (1993), at
426. “Of course, sociology is not an unqualified improvement over abstract economic theory.” Id.
218. See the references in Ellickson, and notes 22-24. Supra note 217. at 543, (noting that towards
the mid-1990s, norms had become the “hottest topic in the legal academy”); see also the Symposium on
“Norms and Corporate Law,” published in the 1996 volume of the U. PA.. L. Rev.; see also the
contributions in RULES AND NETWORKS. THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
(Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001).
219. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L. J. 371 (2003); Simon Deakin,
The Many Futures of the Contract of Employment, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION.
TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES & POSSIBILITIES 177 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); Gralf-Peter
Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law. The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private
Law,
23
ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE
185
(2002),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531063; Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of
Corporate Law? Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-Regulation, JURIDIKUM 136
(2002b); Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law, 13 IND. J. OF
GLOBAL STUD. 261 (2006).
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contractual governance—traditionally torn between contentions of
contract’s political nature and private autonomy—unfolds in a
polycontextural sphere which renders any attempt to safely anchor
contract law in this or that social theory, largely futile.220

V. CONCLUSION
This paper has traced the rising prominence of formalism and
functionalism in diverse areas of “post-welfare state” legal regulation as
un-ironic recurrences of the twentieth century’s quest for law. Today,
formalist, functionalist, responsive, reflexive and autopoietic law is
everywhere. Lawyers can snatch up everything and make it their own—a
matter of conversation, the subject of a lawsuit or an essential element of a
social utopia, seen now through a lawyer’s eyes. But the real conceptual
contribution of autopoietic law to the previously revisited historical
narrative of formalist/functionalist law is one that is, strikingly, at the
center of contemporary assessments of institutional development.221 The
concept of autopoietic law helps to carve out the particularity of the legal
operation in distinction to any other form of societal communication, be it
politics, religion, art or economics. Law’s particularity relies on its selfreferentiality, its being thrown back onto its own mode of operation, its
self-referential reproduction of its system’s content and form through its
code, unique to law and at the basis of any aspiration to unity and
cohesion.222 The radicality of the concept is becomes apparent when we
contrast the historical with the conceptual sketch. Whereas the former
would “find” law to be, at least since Western modernity, invariably tied
up with different emanations of the state,223 autopoietic law detaches law
from its—historically contingent—institutional affiliation, but understands
law in its raw exposure to its social environment. In that sense, law in fact
is everywhere, and it has no choice. The law’s presence in societal conflict
is brought into even sharper relief when we see that its institutional
constellation with the state is only one among endless possibilities of law’s
exposure to and its role in society. Autopoietic law, then, radicalizes the
particularity of law’s operation by emphasizing its self-referential code220. For a comprehensive discussion, see GRAF-PETER CALLIESS/PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (forthcoming).
221. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990); Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path Dependence and the
Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
DYNAMICS 205 (1994).
222. Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO
LAW AND SOCIETY 12 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988).
223. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law and the State. Comparative Perceptions and
Historical Observations, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT [RabelsZ] 345 (2007).
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driven quality on the one hand while laying bare law’s openness,
diffusion, vulnerability and fragility in societal processes on the other.
This gives an entirely new meaning to the formalism/functionalism
narrative that we have seen to be central to law’s trajectory in the
twentieth century. Autopoietic law emphasizes how both the positivist and
critical descriptions of formalism underestimate the closure of law’s selfreferential reproduction, which only operates through law-internal
terminology. While the legal positivist pays a high price for law’s inner
coherence,224 the critical legal scholar risks losing law as form by decrying
it as camouflage for different emanations of power. In turn, autopoietic
law radicalizes the functionalist’s instrumentalization of law as a means of
social engineering by leaving the driver’s seat empty. Rejecting the idea
that law, from any single “outside” point, could determine the outcome of
social conflicts, autopoietic law stresses the way in which law is a mere,
yet highly particular, form of communication. Building on the concept of a
functionally differentiated society, the law can no longer be seen as
performing a particularly determinative or representative function with
regard to economic, political or other interests but itself can only perform
a legal function. Instead of being removed from society, law is part of it,
everywhere exposed to and in communication with it.

224. By positing a Grundnorm at the basis of all law, Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and
Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1941); HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE [1945] (Wedberg trans., 1961).

